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Introduction
In the wake of a global epidemic of revelations of corporate misbehaviour in the beginning years of this decade came a resurgence in interest in and attentiveness towards the objective of improving corporate governance (Carlin & Ford, 2004) . A major element of that wave of consciousness was manifested in a heightened focus on the need for improvements in the transparency, consistency, comparability and decision usefulness of corporate financial reports. Failures on one or more of these dimensions more often than not lay at the heart of high profile corporate scandals and collapses such as those epitomised by Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing 1 , HIH 2 and Parmalat 3 .
From the time the global wave of governance crises reached its tumult until the present, the Australian market for hybrid financial instruments has burgeoned in size.
According to estimates compiled by the Reserve Bank of Australia, the value of outstanding hybrid financial instruments more than doubled between 2001 and 2004, while hybrid issuance as a proportion of non intermediated corporate debt issuance more than tripled over the same period 4 . Yet there are persistent questions as to the legitimacy of hybrid financial instruments, some commentators suggesting that their entire existence rests upon a foundation of regulatory arbitrage and that in consequence they are to be seen as another example of a classic financial reporting mirage. At first glance they appear equity like, but closer inspection reveals a lineage far more dominated by the hallmarks of debt 5 (Williams, 2005) .
Such views are not without foundation. The mandatory requirement for adoption of international accounting standards by listed Australian companies with reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 has already caused shockwaves. The key reason for this is that IAS 32 6 has shifted the basis for classification of financial instruments as falling into the categories of debt or equity by requiring that this task be dominated by considerations related to the economic substance, not the legal form, or the instrument. The thin veneer sufficient to imbue instruments with an equity-like character under the previous regulatory regime appears unlikely to suffice in a changed reporting environment and in consequence corporate Australia has responded with a raft of pre-emptive buybacks 7 , covenant modifications for pre-existing instruments 8 and continued innovation 9 in the design and packaging of new security offerings.
This tension between the objectives of greater transparency and accuracy in financial reporting and the regulatory arbitrage laced current which underpins the existence of hybrid securities provides an interesting backdrop for empirical research, of which surprisingly little has been undertaken in the Australian context, though some influential research relating to hybrids has been published internationally (e.g; Hopkins, 1996; Engel et al, 1999; Laurent, 2000.) Consequently, a key motivation of this paper is to provide evidence and analysis to fill that gap. In particular, this paper demonstrates the potentially distorting impacts of the use of hybrid securities as an element of firm capital structure under both historical and forward looking financial reporting regimes.
It is argued that despite the advances in the quality of the financial reporting architecture associated with Australia's adoption of international financial reporting standards, the risks of these distortions remain essentially undiminished. As a result, further development of the reporting framework is argued to be necessary if the goal 6 And thus its Australian corollary -AASB 132 Financial Instruments: -Disclosure and Presentation. 7 For example the ReCAPS hybrids issued by large Australian retailer Coles Myer. These instruments, through which Coles Myer raised approximately AUD $700 million were originally issued in December 2000. All were bought back by the company in July 2005. The company explained that its motivation in engaging in the buyback was to "provide a simpler, more efficient capital structure that will benefit the company and shareholders over time." Given that these were perpetual instruments of no fixed maturity, their survival for so limited a period speaks volumes as to the fragility of the desirability and usefulness of hybrid instruments in the face of regulatory change. 8 For example the "WINs" hybrids issued by Woolworths Limited, another large Australian retailer. Note 24 to the company's 2004 annual report notes that the trust deed governing these instruments was altered post balance date, in preparation for the changed reporting environment ushered in by the adoption of international financial reporting standards. 9 An important example of this is the arrival of so called "step up" securities into the Australian hybrids market. These are of recent invention and should continue to allow classification as equity for financial reporting purposes. These are discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
of greater transparency and accuracy in financial reporting is to be achieved. In supporting these arguments, the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 provides background context by describing nature and size of the Australian market for hybrid securities. Section 3 sets out details of the methodology we employed to measure the impact of hybrids on key measures of financial performance, risk and firm value. We set out our results in Section 4, while in Section 5 we briefly outline our conclusions and some suggestions for future research.
The Australian Hybrids Market
Even as recently as the late 1990s bank lending dominated corporate debt raising in Thus not only had Australian corporations increasingly moved towards the creation and issue of their own debt securities rather than relying on traditional bank loan products, the type of instruments used by these organisations to facilitate the raising of capital had also substantially altered. Hybrids in particular, became far more popular than they had been even a short period earlier. This rise in popularity is captured in the data set out in Table 1 , which sets out the gross value of hybrid issuance of hybrids by Australian corporations in both domestic and offshore capital markets between 1998 and 2005. The Australian market for hybrid securities has also been characterised by rapid innovation in instrument design. This echoes experience with hybrid securities in international contexts (Smithson et al, 1993) . In the Australian context, a number of factors combine to explain innovation. First, hybrid securities have been targeted far more to a retail investor audience than traditional corporate bond offerings. This has biased the design of many instruments towards the provision of higher yields 11 than those available on alternative asset classes, or on access to streams of tax credits not normally associated with distributions paid on traditional debt instruments (Moody's,
2001, p. 5).
Changes to financial reporting requirements have also been a strong driver of variations in instrument design. The data set out in Table 3 The degree of security design innovation inherent in the Australian hybrid security market has resulted in considerable fragmentation. Many issues are small in terms of absolute dollars raised and are often unrated. Compared to vanilla debt security offerings they are complex, yet ironically have been most often pitched at a retail investor base which may not fully appreciate the magnitude and nature of risks associated with exposure to them. (Smith, 2003) .
Despite the high degree of variation in instrument design which we have noted characterises the Australian market for hybrid instruments, it is possible to capture the broad parameters of the most important sub-classes of securities which exist within the marketplace. As the data in Table 3 (above) makes clear, the three most significant of these subclasses are hybrids which can be generally described as income securities, reset convertible preference shares and, more recently, perpetual step up preference shares. The essential features of these security sub-classes are summarised in Table 4, below. 
Reset convertible preference shares/notes
The issuer has the option to change the terms or redeem the securities on a predetermined date. The investor has the option to accept the new terms of the security, or to request an exchange. If an exchange is requested, the issuer decides whether it is for ordinary shares or cash.
While income securities dominated the Australian market for hybrid securities in the late 1990s, by far the most common form of hybrid found in this jurisdiction at present is the reset convertible instrument. Both are highly vulnerable to reclassification as debt under IFRS, the former because they are essentially indistinguishable from subordinated debt 12 and the latter because reset convertibles typically gave investors the right to convert their securities into a variable number of ordinary shares on defined dates or in response to certain defined events 13 .
Perpetual step up securities have become the most significant form of hybrid issued in Australia since the Australian Accounting Standards Board announced 14 pending
Australian Accounting Standard 132 15 , pursuant to which most pre-existing forms of hybrid securities would be vulnerable to reclassification from equity to debt for financial reporting purposes. Their popularity is not coincidental, but rather, is based upon the fact that step up securities issued since December 2003 have been designed specifically to avoid being classified as debt for financial reporting purposes. They therefore represent a continuation of the tendency of issuers to design hybrid instruments with a view to achieving regulatory arbitrage -classification as equity while not far beneath the surface lie many of the characteristics of debt.
Thus, far from destroying the inertia of the Australian market for hybrid securities, the introduction of IFRS 16 has merely stimulated further design innovation and greater instrument design complexity 17 . Hybrid issuance continues apace, but it is not at all 12 Though they managed to be classified as equity due to their perpetual maturity and the existence of some degree of conditionality in relation to the right on the part of investors to receive promised cashflow streams. 13 As noted in the introduction to this paper, many organisations have responded to this likely change in classification by engaging in pre-emptive buy-backs of these instruments. As a further example, in August 2004, Computershare Limited notified holders of its reset preference shares that it had opted to invoke an early conversion of the instruments to ordinary equity, in accordance with the terms of issue of the reset preference shares. Its explanation for its decision to do this was that: "The board has made this decision following the release in Thus, IFRS or not, an investigation of the potential impact of hybrids on the quality and accuracy of financial disclosures appears warranted. Section 3 below describes our methodology for investigating the nature and magnitude of the problem.
Measuring the Impact of Hybrids
A central contention of this paper is that the regulatory arbitrage upon which the construction of hybrid securities is founded results in the systemic treatment of these instruments as equity for financial reporting purposes. It is in turn posited that this has the potential distort reported financial aggregates such that common measures of financial performance and risk calculated on the basis of those aggregates fail to convey an appropriate image of the underlying organic financial reality of the reporting entity.
Testing these propositions requires the implementation of a two stage methodology. We test our first contention by applying a debt / equity characteristics matrix technique against a sample of hybrid securities currently outstanding in Australian capital markets. Specifically, our sample includes one randomly selected example of underlying business of the issuing entity. Thus FUELS (Franked Unsecured Equity Linked Securities) were issued by energy company Santos, PRESSES (Preferred Reset Securities Exchangeable for Shares) were issued by newspaper and media company Fairfax Limited -and so on. 18 An obvious example being other jurisdictions which have adopted or which are moving towards the adoption of IFRS.
each of the three main classes of hybrid securities in existence in Australia, being income notes 19 , reset convertible preference shares 20 and perpetual step up securities 21 . In order to determine the appropriate classification of each security we examine, we compare its essential characteristics against a six point debt / equity characteristic matrix, and determine, on balance, whether the inherent characteristics of the instrument suggest that the instrument lies closer to "pure debt" or "pure equity".
In undertaking this analysis, we classify pure debt as having the following characteristics. First, it enjoys contractually defined cashflows. Second, debt enjoys priority claims to the cashflows of the debtor entity while that entity remains a going concern, and to distributions flowing from disposal of assets in the case of liquidation.
Finally, pure debt instruments are structured to have a finite, known maturity. By way of contrast, pure equity instruments do not enjoy contractually defined cashflows, have only residual claims to cashflows (both while the business remains a going concern and in the context of liquidation) and have an indefinite maturity 22 . We discuss the results of this analysis in section 4, below.
Where we determined that an instrument we reviewed had been misclassified, we undertook the task of recasting selected elements of the raw financial statements released by the organisations which issued the misclassified hybrids we detected in our sample. The most obvious impact of misclassifying a debt instrument as equity is to reduce the apparent leverage of the issuing organisation. Therefore, where necessary, we recast the balance sheet by removing inappropriately classified hybrids from outstanding equity and adding them to the issuing entity's on balance sheet liabilities. We capture any differences by measuring changes in both the debt / equity ratio and the leverage ratio. The results of this analysis are discussed in section 4, below. 19 We use the WINs securities issued by large listed retailer Woolworths Limited as our example of this class of security. 20 We use the reset convertible preference shares (RePS) issued by listed specialty retailer David Jones Limited as our example of this class of security. 21 We use the FUELS securities issued by listed oil and gas producer Santos Limited as our example of this class of security. 22 Albeit with slight modifications to terminology each of Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings use essentially the same approach that we describe above to differentiate between debt and equity securities for the purposes of undertaking credit analysis.
In addition to the obvious balance sheet impact however, there remains the possibility of a material profit and loss impact, since cash distributions paid to holders of misclassified hybrid instruments are typically accounted for as distributions of retained earnings rather than treated as expenses 23 . We make relevant adjustments and measure the impact on earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity. We also test for any impact on reported cashflows from operating activities, since it is normal to classify interest payments as cash outflows from operating activities, but distributions to equity instruments as cash outflows from financing activities.
Finally, by holding the price earnings ratio of the issuing entity's ordinary equity securities constant, we estimate the potential impact on market capitalisation which would result from a restatement of earnings per share flowing from a recasting of the profit and loss statement to reflect the status of outstanding hybrid securities as debt rather than equity 24 .
Results
As briefly noted in section 3, for the purposes of this study we examined a randomly selected income note, reset convertible preference share and perpetual step up security. The income note security we examined for the purposes of this study was the so called Woolworths Income Note (or WINs), issued by Woolworths Limited 25 in November 1999.
With a face value of $100, the WINs securities were officially quoted on the Australian Stock Exchange on 9 December 1999 26 . The instruments are structured so that their holders have no voting rights and rank ahead of preference and ordinary shares for a return of capital in the event of winding up. However, they are 23 That is, interest expense. 24 We assume in doing so that capital markets have priced the ordinary equity securities issued by the firm without impounding the potentially dilutive impact on EPS of a reclassification of that firm's hybrid securities to debt, from equity. Further, for the sake of conservatism, we hold the p/e multiple applied to EPS constant for the purposes of deriving an estimate of the impact on market capitalisation. 25 In light of these characteristics, and applying the methodology we describe in section 3 above, we take the view that despite being treated as equity by Woolworths Limited, these instruments are most appropriately classified as debt. The principal equity like feature they carry is their perpetual maturity, but this is more than offset by the contractual nature of the cashflows enjoyed by the holders of the securities and the prioritisation of the claims enjoyed by holders of WINs over both ordinary and preference equity holders. Essentially, we contend that in substance, these instruments are more akin to subordinated debt than to equity, and ought properly be treated as such in the financial statements of the issuing organisation.
The reset convertible preference share security which we examined for the purposes Having regard to the overall characteristics of these securities by applying our debt / equity classification methodology, we take the view that these securities would be more appropriately classified as debt than equity, though they are classified as equity by David Jones Limited. In forming this judgement, we have had particular regard to the priority claims conferred on the holders of these securities, as well as the strongly contractual features of the designated cashflows associated with the instruments.
The step up security we examined for the purposes of this study are known as FUELS 29 , and were issued by Australian listed oil and gas producer Santos Limited , the dividend calculation is increased by a one-off step-up in the margin by 2.25% (i.e. 1.55% margin + 2.25% step-up + BBSW). The dividend rate assumes full franking, so in the event that a dividend is unfranked or partially franked, the dividends on the FUELS will be increased to compensate for any unfranked amount.
FUELS are perpetual securities and have no maturity, however Santos may convert or exchange some or all of the FUELS for ordinary shares or $100 cash on 30 September 2009 and each dividend payment date thereafter. Santos may elect to convert at any date in certain circumstances including a takeover or scheme of arrangement, or proposed changes to taxation regulation or accounting standards.
The ratio at which FUELS will convert to ordinary shares is calculated by reference to the market price of the ordinary shares during the 20 business days immediately preceding, but not including, the conversion date, less a conversion discount of 2.5%.
Notwithstanding, the conversion ratio will not be greater than 400 ordinary shares for each FUELS security. Again, having regard to the inherent characteristics of the FUELS securities, particularly the contractual nature of the cashflows associated with the instruments and the level of priority afforded to the holders of the securities, we take the view that despite Santos' classification of the instruments as equity, they 30 ASX Stock Ticker Code STO. 31 Under the ticker code STOPB.
would be more appropriately treated as debt. We summarise our findings in Table 5, below. The above analysis demonstrates the empirical reality of the phenomenon about which we conjectured in our introductory remarks -namely that the design of hybrid securities is configured to allow issuers of such securities to adopt equity like accounting treatment even though the economic substance of the instruments tends more closely towards the characteristics of debt. This gives rise to questions as to the potential impact on key measures of financial performance and position caused by the misclassification problem we identify and discuss above.
Our methodology for undertaking this investigation is discussed in section 3, above.
We first tested for impact on key balance sheet based measures of financial position, particularly leverage. Our results are presented in Table 6 , below.
The data demonstrates that the reclassification of hybrid instruments from that adopted by their issuers (equity) to our suggested treatment as debt would have materially impacted both the debt to equity and leverage ratio of each of the organisations we studied.
Were a reclassification to occur, this could have potentially significant impacts on both investor perceptions of the degree of risk associated with providing debt or equity capital to the organisations in question, and could also place the organisations studied at greater risk of breaching predefined debt convenants and other similar contractual obligations.
This may explain the increase in buyback and instrument redesign behaviour we noted previously, in the wake of the Australian Accounting Standards Board's release of draft Australian Accounting Standard 132 32 . For reasons we set out in the discussion of our methodology, the misclassification of hybrid instruments as equity also has implications for key corporate performance measures, by reason of the treatment of cashflows to security holders as distributions of retained equity rather than as interest expense. We therefore measured reported earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity for our sample and subsequently adjusted these measures to our estimate of the values they would have taken on had the cashflows been treated as interest costs (consistent with balance sheet classification of debt). We present our results in Table 7 , below.
32 Refer to sections 1 and 2 of this paper for a review of this discussion. In this vein, it is particularly interesting to note the circumstances under which the perpetual step up security we examined for the purposes of this paper -the Santos Limited 'FUELS", came into existence. Santos issued the FUELS securities in 2004 in part to fund the buy back of AUD $350 million worth of previously issued reset convertible preference shares (RCPS). These securities were vulnerable to reclassification from equity to debt as a result of the changed accounting rules embodied in AASB132. The new rules took effect for all accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2005, so from this point of view, the buyback of the pre-existing RCPS securities prior to the conclusion of 2004 was distinctly advantageous. Across our sample, both earnings per share and return on assets fall when adjusted for hybrid misclassification, the magnitude of the change being in the order of 5%.
Conversely, adjusted return on equity (ROE) increases for each of the organisations we study, a result driven primarily by the significant increases in adjusted leverage we set out in Table 6 , above.
We also tested the cashflow data disclosed by our sample of organisations to determine the extent to which the misclassification of hybrids as equity impacted on the presentation of organisational cashflow data. The impetus for this investigation is the realisation that while cash distributions to equity holders are typically classified as cash outflows arising from financing activities, interest payments to debt holders are by convention classified as cash outflows arising from operating activities.
Since cashflow from operating activities is generally accepted to be a vital metric pertaining to organisational financial health and value generation intensity (e.g see; Naser, 1993; Mulford & Comiskey, 2002) , we test for the degree of impact on cashflow presentation brought about by hybrid misclassification. We set out our results in Table 8 , below. Though not highly material as a proportion of total reported operating cashflows in our sample, each organisation we studied did nonetheless adopt the convention of treating their cash distributions to hybrid security holders as cashflows from financing activities, even in cases where the documentation describing the structure of their hybrid securities clearly labels such distributions as "interest".
Finally, having regard to our revised estimates of earnings per share (as set out in Table 7 , above), we estimated the potential impact on market capitalisation of the sample of organisations we reviewed in the event that they reclassified their hybrid instruments as debt and altered all profit and loss reporting commensurately with that transformation. As discussed in the description of our methodology, for the sake of conservatism and consistency, we elected not to alter the observed price earnings ratios exhibited by our sample organisations in the conduct of this exercise.
As the data in Table 9 below indicates, the estimated impact on market capitalisation
for each organisation appears material, a matter of concern for ordinary equity holders as well as those with considerable wealth contingently tied to the value of the firm's ordinary equity, for example option holders. 
Conclusion
The essential premise which motivated this paper was that despite a growing focus on improved transparency, accuracy and consistency in financial reporting evident in the wake of a raft of high profile corporate scandals which broke in the beginning years of the new millennium, significant threats to such ideas still remained unchecked. We examined hybrid securities as an example of a construct which, as the evidence we have discussed above clearly suggests, demonstrates that this threat is not merely conjectural, despite high profile "reform" to financial reporting rules in Australia in the form of the adoption of international financial reporting standards.
In our view, this only adds weight to the calls made by other scholars (e.g; Anthony, 2004; Brilof, 2004; McBarnet & Whelan, 1999) for continued revisions to me made to financial reporting frameworks with a view to further engendering a reporting philosophy and culture founded on the principal that financial statements should reflect economic substance rather than being trapped as the slaves of form.
Our study provides evidence that much territory remains to be covered before such a state of affairs is likely to be reached. In particular, our study reinforces the dynamic nature of regulatory arbitrage, as evidenced by the redesign of hybrid financial instruments to a form amenable to survival under forthcoming financial reporting regulatory regimes before the commencement date of those regimes. In effect, by designing financial reporting standards with a highly technical and detail based bent, regulators appear to have stoked the fires of instrument design creativity and ensured the continued viability of financial reporting practices which, even at best, must be viewed as questionable.
While the case of hybrid financial instruments is of interest treated alone, as we have done here, the better view is that hybrid instruments represent only one of a matrix of phenomena which continue to derogate from the quality of external financial reporting, including, in particular, off balance sheet financing vehicles, certain forms of lease financing structures and equity linked compensation instruments, including options.
While this may seem an eclectic list, the difficulty inherent in each of its constituent elements is the failure of current financial reporting practices to adhere to a substance based approach. The data we present and discuss in relation to hybrids adds to understanding of the magnitude of the danger inherent with continued adherence to financial reporting rules not firmly embedded on the philosophy of giving precedence to highlighting the underlying economic substance of transactions or positions, above all other objectives. Much room remains for further empirical and theoretical work aimed at providing further illumination in relation to this critical point.
